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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
underscores the overly broad reading given CPLR 203(e) in the Berlin
decision. However, where the facts of the case permit the reasonable
conclusion that notice of the wrongful death claim was given by the
original pleadings, justice is disserved by denying the assertion of such
claim upon a technical construction of the provision. It is true that the
new cause of action is supplemental in nature, since it did not exist
when the original action was commenced, but in light of the liberal
construction mandate, CPLR 203(e) should not be restrictively inter-
preted to exclude supplementary causes of action from the operation of
the relation back doctrine. The best approach lies in a balancing of the
equities; the resultant hardship to the plaintiff if the claim is denied
as opposed to the prejudice to the defendant if insufficient notice were
given by the original pleadings. Under these standards, Palmer dearly
achieves a just result.
CPLR 213: Mendel rule applied in impleader context.
In Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co." the Court of Appeals
held, 4 to 3, that the statute of limitations for a cause of action in breach
of warranty ran from the time of sale rather than from the time of
injury. The anomalous result- that the action was barred before the
injury was incurred- was justified as necessary "to prevent the many
unfounded suits that would be brought and sustained against manufac-
turers ad infinitum."' 2 While Mendel involved only one sale, it was
read as "stand[ing] for the proposition that when a defendant is sued
in warranty the period of limitations against him is measured from the
time he sold the item .... "1 3 Thus, it is not surprising that the Mendel
rationale has been extended to the impleader situation. 14
The foundation for this application was laid in C. K. S., Inc. v.
Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc.,15 which clearly held that the statute
of limitations on a warranty claim commences to run at the time that
the third-party defendant sells the item to the third-party plaintiff.
This reasoning was adopted in Perez v. Chutick & Sudakoff,16 wherein
a federal district court refused to allow amendment of a complaint by
1125 N.Y.2d 340, 252 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969). For a symposium on Mendel,
see 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 62 (1970). See also 1 NVK&M 214.14a.
12 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
13 Siegel, Procedure Catches Up-And Makes Trouble, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 63, 69
(1970).
14 See Note, An Appraisal of Judicial Reluctance to Imply an Indemnity Contract in
Time-Barred Breach of Warranty Suits, 39 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 361 (1965).
15 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
10 50 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The court cited C.K.S., Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sports-
wear, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.Y.S.2d 56 (lst Dep't 1964) and City & Country Say.
Bank v. Kramer & Sons, 43 Misc. 2d 731, 252 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964).
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adding a claim for breach of warranty, on the ground that the defendant
would be prejudiced in that his action to recover over would be barred
by the statute of limitations.
This interpretation has now been approved by the Second Circuit,
in Caruloff v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp.17 A television repair-
man had lost an eye when he was struck by a retainer wire spring on a
tuner. He sued the manufacturer of the television, who impleaded, on
grounds of negligence and breach of implied warranty, the manufac-
turer of the defective part. The district court held that the manufac-
turer was actively negligent in not warning repairmen of the danger
involved in servicing the tuner and upheld the defense of the statute
of limitations. It held that the cause of action for breach implied war-
ranty accrued at the time of sale and not at the time of injury. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.'8
The fact that the defendant was guilty of active negligence makes
this decision somewhat palatable. Nevertheless, a rule which bars a cause
of action before it accrues is subject to strong criticism.' 9 One can
readily imagine a situation in which an innocent intermediary is with-
out recourse under this rule; this raises constitutional questions about
deprivation of property without due process of law. On balance, it
appears that a claim-over based on warranty, like a claim-over in active
negligence, should be deemed an action for indemnification.20
ARTICLE 10-PARTIES GENERALLY
CPLR 1007: Broad indemnification clause held not to cover active
negligence of lessor causing injury to lessee.
Redding v. Gulf Oil Corp.,21 the first New York case concerning
indemnification contracts to be reported since the Court of Appeals
decided Levine v. Shell Oil Co.,22 has narrowly construed the latter
decision. The Levine Court had held that the Thompson-Starrett
doctrine, 23 under which an indemnification contract would be recog-
nized as encompassing active negligence only if it expressly stated that
it should be so interpreted, was "no longer a viable statement of the
17 445 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'g 314 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
18 Id. at 875.
10 See, e.g., 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 214, commentary at 430 (1972). "It would be far
simpler if it were simply said that there is strict liability in tort, declared outright, without
an illusory contract mask. W. PROSSER, TORTS 681 (3d ed. 1964)."
20 Accord, Siegel. supra note 13, at 69-70.
21 67 Misc. 2d 464, 324 N.Y.S.2d 490 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971).
2228 N.Y.2d 205, 269 N.E.2d 799, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 46 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 355, 367 (1971).
23 Thompson-Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 271 N.Y. 36, 2 N.E.2d 35 (1936).
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